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I. INTRODUCTION
The world has become thoroughly familiar with the concept of robotic
systems that can operate without human control. In science fiction, these
have ranged from helpful computers or robotic servants1 to emotionless,
unstoppable killing machines.2 However, autonomous machines—those
that can function with minimal or no human oversight—have become an
almost ubiquitous reality. Machines manage stock trades,3 drive cars,4 and
are increasingly contemplated as a means and method of warfare.5 The
popular perception of future lethal autonomous weapons (LAWS) as
unrestrained killers has spawned both negative public perception and calls
for partial or outright bans on these “killer robots.”6 Contrary to the
contentions of ban proponents, LAWS can be effectively employed in
appropriate circumstances, in compliance with the Law of Armed Conflict
1. For example, the STAR WARS (Lucasfilm 1977) characters C-3PO or R2-D2.
2. See TERMINATOR 2: JUDGMENT DAY (Carolco 1991) (chronicling a high stakes chase to
evade an indestructible robot made of liquid metal aiming to thwart an attempt to save the world from
robotic control); see also Daniel Cebul, Former Google Exec: AI Movie Death Scenarios ‘One to Two Decades
Away’, DEFENSE NEWS (Feb. 28, 2018), https://www.defensenews.com/smr/munich-securityforum/2018/02/28/former-google-exec-ai-movie-death-scenarios-one-to-two-decades-away/
[https://perma.cc/7J6N-3R5U] (explaining despite the pendency of AI, it will not dispense with
human control for critical decision-making).
3. See generally Andrei Kirilenko et al., The Flash Crash: The Impact of High Frequency Trading on an
Electronic Market, 72 J. FIN. 967 (2017) (detailing the impact of automated trading algorithms on the
May 6, 2010, “flash crash” in the U.S. stock market).
4. For example, Google’s self-driving car concept, now known as Waymo. WAYMO,
https://www.google.com/selfdrivingcar/ (last visited July 23, 2019) [https://perma.cc/5E3E-5J8Y].
5. See, e.g., HEATHER M. ROFF, MEANINGFUL HUMAN CONTROL OR APPROPRIATE HUMAN
JUDGMENT? THE NECESSARY LIMITS ON AUTONOMOUS WEAPONS 5–6 (Ariz. St. Univ. Global
Security Initiative briefing paper for Conference of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons,
2016) (contemplating the balance between autonomy and human control in the robotic weapon
systems).
6. See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, LOSING HUMANITY: THE CASE AGAINST KILLER
ROBOTS 2 (2012) (“Our research and analysis strongly conclude that fully autonomous weapons should
be banned and that governments should urgently pursue that end.”).
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(LOAC) by implementing a series of control mechanisms and tactics,
techniques, and procedures (TTPs) that are either already in use by the U.S.
military, or can be readily adapted to the context of autonomous weapons
systems.
Proponents advocating for a full ban on LAWS make categorical
statements contending, “robots with complete autonomy would be
incapable of meeting [LOAC] standards,” and that LAWS would necessarily
“strip civilians of protections from the effects of war that are guaranteed
under the law.”7 Others argue that LAWS violate the LOAC principle of
“humanity” in war, which requires human characteristics and compassion.8
Ban proponents deem that “killing at a remove” strips the human aspect
from war, making it cold, impersonal, and therefore, inherently
indiscriminate.9 These arguments are based around a belief that war and
violence are fundamental human endeavors, and that only a compassionate
human being can ethically and morally make the decision to use lethal
force.10 This failure of “humanity” in LAWS, many argue, brings such
weapons within the ambit of the Martens Clause, which prohibits the means
or methods of warfare that diverge from the “principles of international law
derived from established custom, from the principles of humanity and from
the dictates of public conscience.”11 Many proponents of a preemptive ban
also employ incomplete factual assertions to bolster their arguments.
One example of such reasoning is to argue in broad terms that machines
are, and will always be, incapable of distinguishing between civilians and
7. Id. at 3, 30.
8. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, ADVANCING THE DEBATE ON KILLER ROBOTS: 12 KEY
ARGUMENTS FOR A PREEMPTIVE BAN ON FULLY AUTONOMOUS WEAPONS 15 (2014).
9. See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 6, at 40 (“the proliferation of unmanned
systems, which . . . has a ‘profound effect on the “impersonalization of battle,”’ may remove some of
the instinctual objections to killing.”).
10. See, e.g., Holy See, Elements Supporting the Prohibition of Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems 3–4
(U.N. Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, 2016 Meeting of Experts on LAWS, Working
Paper, Apr. 7, 2016), https://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/752E16C02C9AEC
E4C1257F8F0040D05A/$file/2016_LAWSMX_CountryPaper_Holy+See.pdf [https://perma.cc/
DYK5-C4G7] (discussing how LAWS can undermine foundations for peace—the mutual trust
between nations).
11. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), of 8 June 1977, art. 1(2), opened for
signature Dec. 12, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter AP I]; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 6,
at 24 (arguing the Martens Clause should apply as a means to prohibit LAWS). While the United States
is not a state party to AP I, and therefore not bound by its terms, it does consider much of AP I to
reflect customary international law. R. Craig Burton, Recent Issues with the Use of MatchKing Bullets and
White Phosphorous Weapons in Iraq, ARMY LAW, Aug. 2006, at 19 n.4 (Aug. 2006).
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combatants, or of assessing intent (e.g., differentiating between a “fearful
civilian” and a “threatening enemy combatant”).12 This line of thinking
assumes that because machines were incapable of making such assessments
as of 2012, that this will always be the case; however, developments over the
last several years in the ability of machines to assess emotion contradict that
assertion.13 Furthermore, ban proponents discuss the complexity of
warfare in an urban environment, citing to the recent counter-insurgency,
or urban combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, arguing that machines
would be incapable of distinguishing between combatants and civilians or
non-combatants as required under the LOAC.14 In light of this complexity,
if a machine is incapable of balancing military necessity against the danger
of collateral damage, it may fail to apply a concept known as proportionality
to determine whether an attack is justified.15 This flawed reasoning is
twofold. First, counterinsurgency or urban warfare is one of the most
complex combat environments, but it is not the only possible environment.
Secondly, questions about the application of the LOAC concern rules and
decision-making processes, as well as results. Reasonable mistakes which
lead to undesired results are not necessarily criminal or unlawful. These are
complicated situations and humans often miscalculate questions of
distinction and proportionality, mistakenly injuring or killing civilians or
other non-combatants as a result.16 These logical flaws fail to account for
the rapid progression of modern machines’ capabilities to perceive and
process their environment.

12. Such as differentiating between a “fearful civilian and a threatening enemy combatant.”
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 6, at 4.
13. Sophie Kleber, 3 Ways AI is Getting More Emotional, HARV. BUS. REV. (July 31, 2018),
https://hbr.org/2018/07/3-ways-ai-is-getting-more-emotional [https://perma.cc/3EMV-QVGV].
14. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 6, at 30–31.
15. See U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., LAW OF WAR MANUAL §§ 2.4–2.5 (2016) for a discussion of the
concepts of distinction and proportionality. See also HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 6, at 3–4
(“The rules of distinction, proportionality, and military necessity are also important tools for protecting
civilians from the effects of war, and fully autonomous weapons would not be able to abide by those
rules.”).
16. See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Cent. Command, U.S. Central Command Releases U.S. Forces:
Afghanistan Investigation into Airstrike on Doctors Without Borders Trauma Center in Kunduz,
Afghanistan (Apr. 29, 2016), https://www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/PRESS-RELEASES/PressRelease-View/Article/904574/april-29-centcom-releases-investigation-into-airstrike-on-doctorswithout-borde/ [https://perma.cc/Y7U9-6B6J] (describing the October 3, 2015 airstrike on a Doctors
Without Borders facility that resulted in at least 42 deaths and 229 other injuries as an egregious mistake
of distinction attributable to human error).
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This article will describe the ways in which many TTPs and concepts
currently in use by the U.S. and allied militaries can be readily applied to
LAWS. Part II of this article will discuss the current state of development
of LAWS, including examples of some of the various LAWS and other
autonomous capabilities currently being fielded and developed. Part III will
discuss legal challenges and objections to the employment of such systems.
Finally, Part IV will provide a more detailed description of (1) developments
in autonomous systems that demonstrate the premature concerns and
misunderstandings of ban proponents, and (2) a number of precautionary
TTPs broken down into mission design controls, capability design controls,
and “cognitive” design controls. Comprehensive application of these
controls can mitigate legal concerns with LAWS and ensure their
employment in accordance with the LOAC.
II. THE CURRENT STATE OF AUTONOMOUS WEAPONS SYSTEM
DEVELOPMENT
Despite contentions from non-governmental organizations (NGOs), like
Human Rights Watch and the International Committee of the Red Cross
(ICRC), countries continue to press ahead with the development of
autonomous systems, including systems that are capable of employing lethal
force. Prior to discussing the proper employment of LAWS, it is necessary
to define the term. For its part, the United States Department of Defense
defines autonomous weapons as those that “once activated, can select and
engage targets without further intervention by a human operator. This
includes human-supervised autonomous weapon systems that are designed
to allow human operators to override operation of the weapon system, but
can select and engage targets without further human input after
activation.”17 The ICRC defines autonomous weapons as those that can
exercise the critical functions of selecting and attacking targets without
human intervention.18 While there is some disagreement at the margins,
the critical pieces of any definition appears to be the ability to select and
engage targets without human intervention. With that baseline definition in

17. U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., DIRECTIVE NO. 3000.09, AUTONOMY IN WEAPON SYSTEMS 13–14
(2012).
18. Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross Conference on Int’l Humanitarian Law, Report on International
Human Law and the Challenges of Contemporary Armed Conflicts, at 44, ICRC Doc. 31IC/15/11 (Oct. 2015)
[hereinafter ICRC 2015 Report].
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mind, there are a number of autonomous capabilities in various stages of
development.
The United States military is developing both aerial and maritime (surface
and subsurface) unmanned autonomous systems for a variety of roles. The
U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) has worked in partnership with the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) to develop autonomous airlaunched systems with swarming capabilities.19 This swarming capability
envisions the use of small, expendable “kamikaze drones” that are
essentially small Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) with an integrated
warhead and sensor array, that could fly into identified hostile targets and
explode.20 Defense conglomerate Lockheed Martin is also pursuing
advances in manned-unmanned teaming.21 Other UAS developments
include potential combat unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs)22 that are
capable of launching and recovering from U.S. Navy aircraft carriers.23 The
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) has also worked to
develop maritime unmanned surface vehicles that would perform submarine
tracking missions for up to ninety days of fully autonomous operation.24
The development of these surface vehicles has also spawned a pair of

19. Michael Hardy, Pentagon Proves Air-Launched UAV Swarm Ability, C4ISRNET (Mar. 15, 2016),
http://www.c4isrnet.com/story/military-tech/uas/2016/03/15/pentagon-proves-uav-swarmability/81803256/ [https://perma.cc/KC5Z-NBX6].
20. James Drew, USAF’s Small UAS Roadmap Calls for Swarming ‘Kamikaze’ Drones,
FLIGHTGLOBAL (May 4, 2016), https://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/usafs-small-uasroadmap-calls-for-swarming-kamikaz-424973/ [https://perma.cc/5U9L-W8C7].
21. Yasmin Tadjdeh, Lockheed Martin Investing in Autonomy, Manned-Unmanned Teaming Technology,
NDIA BUS. & TECH. MAG. (Mar. 15, 2016), http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/
articles/2016/3/15/lockheed-martin-investing-in-autonomy-mannedunmanned-teaming-technology
[https://perma.cc/8LKK-VRYV].
22. Patrick Tucker, Report: Weapons AI Increasingly Replacing, Not Augmenting,
Human Decision Making, DEFENSE ONE (Sept. 2, 2016), http://www.defenseone.com/technology/
2016/09/report-weapons-ai-increasingly-replacing-not-augmenting-human-decision-making/131826
/ [https://perma.cc/X7E7-LCEU].
23. Brandon Vinson, X-47B Makes First Arrested Landing at Sea, USS GEORGE H. W. BUSH PUB.
AFFAIRS (July 10, 2013), http://www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp?story_id=75298 [https://perma.
cc/X7E7-LCEU].
24. Franz-Stefan Gady, US Navy Is Speed Testing Sub-Hunting Robot Ship,
THE DIPLOMAT (Apr. 5, 2016), http://thediplomat.com/2016/04/us-navy-is-speed-testing-subhunting-robot-ship/ [https://perma.cc/59Y7-CWTS]; Christina Beck, Check Out Sea Hunter,
the US Navy’s New ‘Crewless Ship’, THE CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (May 3, 2016),
http://www.csmonitor.com/Technology/2016/0503/Check-out-Sea-Hunter-the-US-Navy-s-newcrewless-ship [https://perma.cc/DJD5-4CW7].
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unmanned subsurface vehicles25 that could perform a range of missions
including detection, classification, and neutralization of naval mines.26 The
United States is not the only nation developing such weapons.
In 2016, French developer Dassault Aviation’s nEUROn long endurance
Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) UAV27 was considered
one of the “most advanced” weapon systems in development.28 Not to be
left out in the cold alone by its historic French rival, the United Kingdom,
through British Aerospace, is also developing an autonomous UAV, the
Taranis.29 France and the United Kingdom are jointly developing an
autonomous maritime mine countermeasure capability, that will operate as
part of a network of manned and unmanned surface and subsurface
vessels.30 Other countries are also developing, or have fielded, weapons
with varying degrees of autonomy. For example, South Korea’s Sentry
Guard Robot-1 (SGR-1) guards the Korean Demilitarized Zone (DMZ),31
while Israel boasts an expendable “kamikaze” UAV Harpy/Harop32 and
the underwater anti-mine “Seagull,” contemplated for both anti-submarine
and anti-diver/personnel roles.33 The rapid pace of development for nation
states compared to the slow pace in the development of any treaty regulating
or banning LAWS over the past four years has generated consternation on
the part of ban proponents. The national and diplomatic will to ban
weapons that are so tactically appealing and increasingly widespread appears
25. Michael Peck, Navy Awards Unmanned Wave Glider Contract, C4ISRNET (May 4, 2016),
http://www.c4isrnet.com/story/military-tech/uas/2016/05/04/navy-awards-uuv-wave-gliderliquid-robotics/83923664/ [https://perma.cc/W7M8-LVH4].
26. Michael Peck, Knifefish Passes Mine-Hunting Test, C4ISRNET (Mar. 28, 2017),
https://www.c4isrnet.com/unmanned/uas/2017/03/28/knifefish-passes-mine-hunting-test/
[https://perma.cc/Q6AE-MDM5].
27. nEUROn Unmanned Combat Air Vehicle (UCAV) Demonstrator, AIR FORCE TECH.,
https://www.airforce-technology.com/projects/neuron/ [https://perma.cc/RF8V-FEW6].
28. Tucker, supra note 22.
29. Id.
30. Michael Peck, Britain and France Move Forward on Mineclearing Drone, C4ISRNET
(Nov. 8, 2016), https://www.c4isrnet.com/unmanned/uas/2016/11/08/britain-and-france-moveforward-on-mineclearing-drone/ [https://perma.cc/LWV6-T2XS].
31. Jean Kumagai, A Robotic Sentry for Korea’s Demilitarized Zone, IEEE SPECTRUM (Mar. 1, 2007),
http://spectrum.ieee.org/robotics/military-robots/a-robotic-sentry-for-koreas-demilitarized-zone
[https://perma.cc/3VXC-P29S].
32. Rebecca Crootof, The Killer Robots are Here: Legal and Policy Implications, 36 CARDOZO L. REV.
1837, 1871, 1874 (2015).
33. Barbara Opall-Rome, Elbit Offers Multimission, Unmanned Naval Robot, DEFENSE NEWS
(Mar. 28, 2017), https://www.defensenews.com/smr/unmanned-unleashed/2017/03/28/elbitoffers-multimission-unmanned-naval-robot/ [https://perma.cc/GBT9-CDRS].
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to be faltering.34 Non-military actors have also pursued autonomous
systems such as COTSbot developed by the Queensland University of
Technology in Australia.35 The COTSbot is designed to autonomously
hunt and destroy the invasive Crown of Thorns Starfish (COTS) that is
decimating the Great Barrier Reef.36
The capabilities of various machines have also improved beyond those
thought possible just a few years ago. The proliferation of artificial
intelligence, including concepts such as machine learning and “deep
learning” into internet algorithms, social media platforms, and electronic
commerce, shows the leaps made over the past several years in machines’
abilities to “learn.”37 This “learning” includes the ability to move beyond
simple pattern recognition to “representational learning” where machines
ingest raw data and discover common features or aspects of a data set to
allow the machine to accurately classify or categorize items in that data set.38
In contrast to the assertions of Human Rights Watch and other ban
proponents that machines will always be incapable of assessing emotion and
intent, there have been recent advances in the “sensory” ability of machines
to apply certain “sensory,” or physiological inputs, data, or object
recognition algorithms to identify human emotions.
Machines have already shown a developmental ability to recognize human
stress without physical contact by using digital cameras and facial pattern
recognition.39 Similar capabilities have also been used to apply pattern
recognition to human behaviors to identify mental states such as happiness

34. Paul Sharre, We’re Losing Our Chance to Regulate Killer Robots, DEF. ONE (Nov. 14, 2017),
http://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2017/11/were-losing-our-chance-regulate-killer-robots/
142517/ [https://perma.cc/G7JH-7G7E].
35. New Robot has Crown-of-Thorns Starfish in its Sights, QUEENSL. UNIV. OF TECH. NEWS (Sept. 2,
2015), https://www.qut.edu.au/news/news?news-id=95438 [https://perma.cc/HRR2-4HZY].
36. Id.
37. Yann LeCun et al., Deep Learning, 521 NATURE 436, 436 (2015).
38. DUSTIN A. LEWIS ET AL., WAR-ALGORITHM ACCOUNTABILITY 19 (2016). Deep learning
uses the concept of “neural networks” to mimic the functionality of the human brain. Id. AlphaGo
employed a combination of human supervision and learning through self-play, allowing a machine to
beat a human player at the Chinese strategy game Go some ten years earlier than expected. Id. at 20;
Cade Metz, In Two Moves, AlphaGo and Lee Sedol Redefined the Future, WIRED MAG. (Mar. 16, 2016),
https://www.wired.com/2016/03/two-moves-alphago-lee-sedol-redefined-future/ [https://perma.
cc/3SPV-R38K].
39. DANIEL J. MACDUFF ET AL., COGCAM: CONTACT-FREE MEASUREMENT OF
COGNITIVE STRESS DURING COMPUTER TASKS WITH A DIGITAL CAMERA, in PROCEEDINGS FOR
THE COMPUTER AND HUMAN INTERACTION CONFERENCE 4000, 4000–03 (2016).
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and depression.40 MIT has developed a system that uses wireless radio
frequency signals to measure, at a distance, a person’s heart rate. It then
applies machine learning and an “emotion classifier” to identify a person’s
mood without physical contact.41 Perhaps most astonishing, Professor Jack
Gallant and his associates have shown the ability to digitally reconstruct
what a person is seeing by measuring brain activity with magnetic resonance
imaging (MRI) technology.42 With a combination of MRI technology, a
sufficient baseline data set for comparison, and algorithms designed to
sense, assess, and characterize various physiological inputs, and other
technologies, it is not outside the realm of possibility that machines could
in fact sense human emotions. While LAWS that could sense and interpret
human emotions would certainly assuage concerns about a machine’s ability
to account for human intent, this is not a prerequisite for their lawful
employment. Rather, by examining the relevant legal challenges, it is
possible to craft a series of control measures that can be readily adopted and
employed to ensure that LAWS are used in compliance with international
law. By employing a suitable algorithm, paired with and effectuated through
a suitably constructed system,43 it is possible to craft a series of
precautionary employment TTPs to ensure that LAWS could be employed
in accordance with the LOAC.

40. Natasha Jaques et al., Predicting Student’s Happiness from Physiology, Phone, Mobility, and Behavioral
Data, MIT (2017), https://dspace.mit.edu/bitstream/handle/1721.1/107917/Picard_Predicting%20
students.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y [https://perma.cc/7KBA-N654].
41. Charles Q. Choi, Mood-Detecting Sensors Could Help Machines Respond to Emotions,
IEEE SPECTRUM (Sep. 20, 2016), https://spectrum.ieee.org/the-human-os/robotics/roboticshardware/mooddetecting-sensor-could-help-machines-respond-to-emotions
[https://perma.cc/
5RY5-THNL].
42. See generally Shinji Nishimoto et al., Reconstructing Visual Experiences from Brain Activity Evoked
by Natural Movies, 21 CURRENT BIOLOGY 1641(presenting a new motion-energy encoding model to
overcome the limitations in MRI brain activity measurements). Part of the research team’s conclusion
is that dynamic brain activity, not only visual experiences, can be decoded using MRI technology. Id.
at 1641, 1645. While the ability to monitor brain activity currently requires contact with the subject’s
head, it may be possible in the future for such brain activity to be “read” remotely from a distance.
43. Harvard’s Program on International Law and Armed Conflict (PILAC) poses that there are
“two key ingredients” required for a machine to “make and effectuate a decision”: an algorithm, paired
with “a suitably capable constructed system.” LEWIS ET AL., supra note 38, at 15–18.
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III. LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR EMPLOYMENT OF
LETHAL AUTONOMOUS WEAPONS SYSTEMS
A. LOAC: The Four Principles, and Challenges Presented by LAWS
As a foundational matter, there are four core concepts of the LOAC, and
employment of any weapon system (autonomous or otherwise) must
comply with those requirements in order to be lawful. These concepts are
(1) military necessity, (2) distinction, (3) proportionality, and (4) humanity
or the limitation of unnecessary suffering. Military necessity, distinction,
and the related concept of proportionality are really where the difficulty lies
with regard to the employment of LAWS. The concept of humanity or
unnecessary suffering does not appear to pose an issue so long as LAWS
employ lethal or kinetic means in accordance with their expected use.44
Blanket statements regarding distinction, proportionality, and military
necessity, such as “robots with complete autonomy would be incapable of
meeting international humanitarian law standards,”45 have led to calls to
ban autonomous weapons as part of the United Nation’s Convention on
Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) treaty process.46 However, such
statements do not account for other possibilities, such as the employment
of TTPs to mitigate such capability gaps. Such TTPs could be used as
precautions in the employment of LAWS to ensure their use is in accordance
with the LOAC.47 Before proposing solutions, it is necessary to identify
the legal and practical challenges of employing LAWS.
The first concept, military necessity, is the principle that “justifies the use
of all measures needed to defeat the enemy as quickly and efficiently as
possible that are not prohibited by the law of war.”48 Pursuant to the
concept of military necessity, those objects, materiel, or personnel which by
their nature, purpose, location, or use make an effective contribution to
thwarting enemy military action, may be made the object of an attack.49
The related concept is the obligation to distinguish between military
objectives and civilian objects. This is known as “distinction,” and is in
44. Jeffrey S. Thurnher, No One at the Controls: Legal Implications of Fully Autonomous Targeting,
67 JOINT FORCES Q. 77, 80–82 (2012).
45. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 6, at 3.
46. ICRC 2015 Report, supra note 18, at 44.
47. AP I, supra note 11, at art. 57.
48. U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., supra note 15, at § 2.2.
49. Thurnher, supra note 44, at 80; Michael N. Schmitt, Military Necessity and Humanity in
International Humanitarian Law: Preserving the Delicate Balance, 50 VA. J. INT’L L. 795, 802–05 (2010).
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essence the capability to “aim” the weapon. In the context of LAWS, it
would refer to the reliability of the weapon making the “right” choice in a
relatively familiar, and well-understood environment, and the predictability
of the weapon making the “right” choice in unfamiliar or unforeseen
circumstances.
This concept of distinction requires an attacker to distinguish between
legitimate military targets, and civilians or civilian objects.50 Ban
proponents have honed in on the most challenging warfighting scenario,
counterinsurgency in urban terrain, in the effort to demonstrate the inability
of LAWS to comply with the LOAC.51 Based on advances in the abilities
of machines to sense their environment, and the potential to assess human
emotions, this may not hold entirely true in the future.52 Regardless, the
law of war recognizes the obligation to “take feasible precautions in
planning and conducting attacks to reduce the risk of harm to civilians” and
other protected objects.53 Such precautions in the attack may include
assessing the risk to civilians, identifying zones in which civilians are unlikely
to be present, adjusting the time of the attack to a time when civilians are
less likely to be present, and thoroughly considering employment of
weapons and weapon systems.54
Through the application of precautionary TTPs based on capabilities and
circumstances, it is entirely possible to employ increasingly capable
machines in compliance with the LOAC. The more accurately machines are
able to identify physiological and behavioral indicators of physical ability,
emotion, or intent, and the more predictably and reliably they can interpret
those indicators in both familiar and unfamiliar scenarios, then it is not
unforeseeable that autonomous systems may be able to more accurately
identify intent or emotion than a human being dealing with the stressors of
50. E.g., AP I, supra note 11, at arts. 48, 51(4).
51. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 6, at 13. Human Rights Watch argues that a machine
could not tell the difference between a wounded or faking enemy. However, this is not a problem
unique to machines. See, e.g., Kevin Sites et al., U.S. Probes Shooting at Fallujah Mosque: Video Shows Marine
Killing Wounded Iraqi, MSNBC.COM & NBC NEWS (Nov. 16 2004), http://www.nbcnews.com/id/
6496898/ns/world_news-mideast_n_africa/t/us-probes-shooting-fallujah-mosque/#.VzOLPjZf17g
[https://perma.cc/C2WT-GFUD] (detailing events during the Battle of Fallujah where a Marine shot
a wounded Iraqi fighter, claiming that the Iraqi was faking his wounds).
52. MACDUFF ET AL., supra note 39, at 4000–03; Jaques et al., supra note 40.
53. See U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., supra note 15, at § 5.11 (quoting Letter from Harold Koh, Legal
Adviser, U.S. Dep’t of State, to Paul Seger, Legal Adviser of Switz. (Dec. 30, 2009) (characterizing
AP I, Article 57(4) as “an accurate statement of the fundamental law of war principle of distinction.”).
54. Id. § 5.11.6 n.372.
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combat. In combination with all other factors, this may contribute to
machines being better able to positively identify lawful targets than humans
in certain circumstances. Furthermore, this question of distinction is most
complicated when dealing with individual human targets. The situation can
be simplified if the LAWS employ sensors such as radar identification,55 or
sensors that can distinguish between enemy armored vehicles and other
types of civilian vehicles.56
Lastly is the thorny question of proportionality. As typically formulated,
the rule of proportionality requires a commander to weigh whether an attack
may cause civilian casualties that are disproportionate to the military
advantage to be gained.57 “In determining whether an attack was
proportionate[,] it is necessary to examine whether a reasonably wellinformed person in the circumstances of the actual perpetrator, making
reasonable use of the information available to him or her, could have
expected excessive civilian casualties to result from the attack.”58 While this
rule is relatively easy to articulate, in practice, it is much more difficult to
apply.59 This question of proportionality becomes increasingly difficult in
light of changing circumstances and dynamic combat environments.60
The International Committee of the Red Cross has expressed “serious
doubts about the capability of developing and using autonomous weapons
systems that would comply with [the LOAC] in all but the narrowest of
scenarios and the simplest of environments.”61 However, not only
machines struggle with this assessment, as it is incredibly difficult and
complex for human beings, as well.62 Despite, or perhaps because of its
55. See, e.g., Harpy NG: Anti-Radiation Loitering Weapon System, ISR. AEROSPACE INDUS.
(May, 2019), https://www.iai.co.il/drupal/sites/default/files/2019-05/HARPY%20Brochure.pdf
[https://perma.cc/V62K-6N22] (“Harpy NG searches, identifies, acquires, attacks and destroys enemy
radar targets.”).
56. See ROYAL AIR FORCE, AIRCRAFT & WEAPONS 87 (Brian Handy, ed., 2007) (describing
technology in a UK employed Brimstone missile when used in “lock after launch” mode).
57. Prosecutor v. Stanislav Galić, IT-98-29-T, Judgement, ¶ 37 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia Dec. 5, 2003).
58. MICHAEL N. SCHMITT, ESSAYS ON LAW AND WAR AT THE FAULT LINES 190 (2012).
59. Id.
60. See ICRC 2015 Report, supra note 18, at 45 (discussing the “key challenges” of
proportionality).
61. Id.
62. See Michael Schmitt, Military Necessity and Humanity in International Humanitarian Law: Preserving
the Delicate Balance, 50 VA. J. INT’L L. 795, 813 (2010) (“An assessment conducted by the U.S. military
judged the treaty ‘to be too ambiguous and complicated to use as a practical guide for military
operation.’”).
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difficulty in application, the rule of proportionality is “an obligation of
conduct, not simply one of results.”63 More simply stated, Additional
Protocol I requires states to take “feasible” precautions to verify the nature
of the military objective prior to conducting an attack.64 At least one expert
involved in the United Nations effort to regulate LAWS has described the
obligation to undertake “feasible” precautions as one of development and
testing of autonomous weapons, and that these efforts must be more
stringent the farther removed human beings are from the strike/no-strike
decision.65 That said, a guarantee of results66 would be too high a bar, and
that is not the standard that the LOAC requires for human actors.67
Concerns surrounding these four principles, as well as concerns about
which personnel or officials to hold liable if a LAWS makes the “wrong”
decision have lead Human Rights Watch, the ICRC, and other nongovernmental organizations to focus on human control as the touchstone
of the LOAC compliance.68 However, the issue of how much human
involvement is appropriate is equally contentious. The DOD requires
“appropriate levels of human judgment,”69 which at first blush appears as
less involvement than that advocated by various experts involved in the
CCW Group of Experts of “effective,” “appropriate,” or “meaningful
human control.”70 While the specific degree of human involvement required
63. Kimberley Trapp, A Framework of Analysis for Assessing Compliance of LAWS with IHL (API)
Precautionary Measures, Note to the Informal Meeting of Experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapons
Systems 1 (Apr. 11–15, 2016) [hereinafter Trapp], https://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(http
Assets)/F78EF612C14FC4F8C1258074004DB93E/$file/Trapp+CCW+Informal+Meeting+of+Ex
perts+(2016).pdf [https://perma.cc/54UN-LMVV].
64. AP I, supra note 11, at art. 57(2).
65. See Trapp, supra note 63, at 7 (explaining how “everything hangs on the development and
testing of the technology”).
66. For example, a guarantee that a LAWS system would never attack a civilian object.
67. See Trapp, supra note 63, at 8 (stating the standards “is simply too high for such weapons
systems to pass Article 36 AP I review”).
68. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 6, at 13 (noting that “[i]t is time for the broader
public to consider the potential advantages and threats of fully autonomous weapons”); ICRC
2015 Report, supra note 18, at 45 (“In this respect, it seems evident that overall human control or
oversight over the selection and attack of targets will continue to be required to ensure respect for
IHL.”); Trapp, supra note 63, at 3–4 (discussing the various aspects of human control in the context of
artificial intelligence) (discussing the various aspects of human control in the context of artificial
intelligence).
69. U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., supra note 17, at 2.
70. Neha Jain, Human-Machine Interaction in Terms of Various Degrees of Autonomy as Well as
Political and Legal Responsibility for Actions of Autonomous Systems, Note to the Informal
Meeting of Experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems 2 (Apr. 11–15, 2016) (emphasis added),
https://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/82C5CE75F5021C3FC1257F9A004A5E
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for any particular system is a critical question, it is beyond the scope of this
paper. The focus of this paper is whether, and how LAWS can be employed
in accordance with the LOAC. One such formulation in response to the
degree of necessary human involvement question was put forth by the
ICRC, writing that the “kind and degree of human control or oversight
required to ensure compliance of an autonomous weapon system with IHL
will depend on the type of autonomous weapon system, the tasks it is
designed to carry out, the environment in which it is intended to be used,
and the types of targets it is programmed to attack, among other factors.”71
Human control and the four LOAC principles have driven the discussion
by non-governmental organizations (NGOs) for a ban or restriction on
LAWS. One such effort is a proposed protocol to the Convention on
Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW).72 However, any proposed Treaty
banning LAWS would require the support of, and ratification by States to
become binding international law.73 With that understanding, the pursuit
of LAWS by many states, at least, indicates an open debate on whether and
how LAWS can be lawfully employed.74
B. State Practice in the Development and Employment of LAWS
Despite the objections of NGOs, and as discussed in Part II of this article,
states have continued to develop LAWS at an ever-increasing pace.
Furthermore, states have presented their views on the applicability of the
LOAC to LAWS, and whether the current rules are sufficient to deal with
05/$file/2016_LAWS+MX+Presentations_ChallengestoIHL_Neha+Jain+oral+note.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8Z9M-Y6TN]; ICRC 2015 Report, supra note 18, at 46.
71. ICRC 2015 Report, supra note 18, at 45.
72. More precisely this is the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain
Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate
Effects as Amended 21 December 2001, ratified Apr. 8, 1982, 19 I.L.M. 1823, 1342 U.N.T.S. 137
[hereinafter CCW]. For efforts relating to LAWS, see Background on Lethal Autonomous Weapons
Systems in the CCW, U.N. OFF. AT GENEVA (last visited June 29, 2019), https://www.unog.ch/
80256EE600585943/(httpPages)/8FA3C2562A60FF81C1257CE600393DF6?OpenDocument
[https://perma.cc/68EL-KBG7].
73. CCW, supra note 72, at art. 4. In particular, the treaty or protocol would only be binding
upon those states which ratify. Non-ratifying states would not be bound. Based on information
presented at the UN Group of Government Experts, it appears unlikely that states, including the
United States, United Kingdom, France, Russia, and China (many of the largest developers of
autonomy in weapons systems), would ratify such a treaty or protocol. See generally Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties, entry into force 27 January 1980, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
74. Compare the Holy See, which objects primarily on ethical grounds, rather than the inability
of LAWS to comply with the LOAC. See, e.g., Holy See, supra note 10 (discussing the potential effects
of LAWS and its legal implications).
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new weapons systems. The answer expressed in state practice, as well as at
the CCW Group of Experts, appears from many of the states most involved
in developing LAWS to be “yes.” As discussed, the United States, United
Kingdom, Israel, and France have proceeded with development on a
number of autonomous weapons systems, including those with potentially
lethal effects. Furthermore, Russia has unequivocally stated that it will not
support any United Nations effort to craft a generally applicable treatybased ban on LAWS, which appears based on the Russian policy of actively
pursuing such autonomous weapons systems.75
The French delegation to the U.N. Group of Governmental Experts
(GGE) on LAWS has articulated that the LOAC in its current form is
sufficient to address the challenges posed by lethal autonomous weapons.76
France points to the requirement in Additional Protocol I, Article 36 to
ensure weapons that are fielded comply with the LOAC, and indicates that
any LAWS will be subject to the same review process.77 Despite the fact
that weapons may be subject to misuse in an unlawful manner, the Article 36
obligation is solely to assess the normal or intended use of the weapon.78
With sufficient precautions, including consideration by the commander of
75. See Patrick Tucker, Russia to the United Nations: Don’t Try to Stop Us From Building Killer
Robots, DEF. ONE (Nov. 21, 2017), http://www.defenseone.com/technology/2017/11/russia-unitednations-dont-try-stop-us-building-killer-robots/142734/?oref=d-topstory&utm_source=Sailthru&ut
m_medium=email&utm_campaign=EBB%2011.27.2017&utm_term=Editorial%20-%20Military%2
0-%20Early%20Bird%20Brief [https://perma.cc/JDR8-FWMM] (“Russia announced that it would
adhere to no international ban, moratorium or regulation on such weapons.”).
76. See France, Legal Framework for Any Potential Development and Operational Use of a
Future Lethal Autonomous Weapons System (LAWS) 3 (U.N. Convention on Certain Conventional
Weapons, 2016 Meeting of Experts on LAWS, Working Paper, Apr. 2016) [hereinafter 2016 France
Working Paper] (unpublished working paper) (on file with U.N. Convention on Certain Conventional
Weapons), https://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/C4D88A9E3530929EC1257
F8F005A226C/$file/2016_LAWSMX_CountryPaper_France+LegalFramework+EN.pdf [https://
perma.cc/BK82-XXSG] (“The current position of France’s prospective analysis considers that the
development and use of lethal autonomous weapons systems cannot be regarded as intrinsically
contrary to international humanitarian law (IHL). Any preventive prohibition of the development of
any potential LAWS would therefore appear premature.”).
77. See id. at 1 (discussing how LAWS fall within the scope of Article 36’s “weapon, means or
method of warfare,” providing the necessary IHL oversight for weapons development).
78. Switzerland, A “Compliance-Based” Approach to Autonomous Weapon Systems 2 (U.N.
Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, Working Paper No. 9, 2017) [hereinafter
2016 Switzerland Working Paper]; 2016 France Working Paper, supra note 76, at 1; Japan, Japan’s
Views on Issues Relating to LAWS ¶ 4 (Apr. 2016) [hereinafter 2016 Japan Working Paper]
(unpublished working paper) (on file with U.N. Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons),
https://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/4E8371EAD5E34263C1257F8C00289B5
E/$file/2016_LAWS+MX_CountryPaper+Japan.pdf [https://perma.cc/9MJS-5CNU].
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such factors as potential civilian casualties, the expected military advantage
to be gained, the operational environment, and the characteristics of a
particular weapon, there is every reason to believe that LAWS can be
employed lawfully in appropriate circumstances.79 While LAWS may not
be ready for full, unfettered employment given the current state of
robotics,80 when understanding the benefits that autonomy has had in other
fields such as faster calculations, and lack of emotions such as fear, panic,
or a desire for vengeance, there are reasons to believe that under the right
circumstances LAWS could make “better decisions” than human beings.81
In fact, many of the claims made by ban proponents have been
characterized as misleading and based on factually incorrect assertions.82
For instance, many ban proponents conflate autonomous systems and
remotely piloted aircraft (RPA or “drones”), and then point to the argument
that “drone” strikes result in higher civilian casualty rates than for manned
missions.83 The problem with this assertion is two-fold. First is that
“drones” or RPAs used to conduct lethal strikes are not autonomous, but
are piloted by human beings using remote means. The second concern is
that some of the comparisons of “drone” and manned missions conflate
dissimilar situations when making their comparison.84 They also discuss
“drone” missions outside of battlefields, where they are forced to rely on
NGO casualty estimates, in comparison to manned missions in “war zones”

79. 2016 France Working Paper, supra note 76, at 2–3.
80. 2016 Switzerland Working Paper, supra note 78, at 3.
81. Compare 2016 France Working Paper, supra note 76, at 2 (“Indeed, the use of autonomous
weapons systems could reduce risks for civilians by making more accurate targeting decisions by means
of faster calculation of available information and more controlled firing decisions due to the absence
of negative feelings like fear, panic and a desire for vengeance.”), with 2016 Japan Working Paper, supra
note 78, at ¶ 3 (“The Japan Ministry of Defense has no plan to develop robots with humans out of the
loop, which may be capable of committing murder.”).
82. Michael N. Schmitt & Jeffrey S. Thurnher, “Out of the Loop”: Autonomous Weapon Systems and
the Law of Armed Conflict, 4 HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. 231, 268 (2013).
83. Micah Zenko & Amelia Mae Wolf, Drones Kill More Civilians Than Pilots Do, FOREIGN
POL’Y (April 25, 2016, 3:59 PM), http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/04/25/drones-kill-more-civiliansthan-pilots-do/ [https://perma.cc/UU9H-9XUZ].
84. Steven J. Barela & Avery Plaw, The Precision of Drones: Problems with the New Data and New
Claims, E-INT’L REL. (Aug. 23, 2016), http://www.e-ir.info/2016/08/23/the-precision-of-dronesproblems-with-the-new-data-and-new-claims/ [https://perma.cc/ZJU9-KSK8]. Barela argues that
when correcting for these analytical errors, that RPA strikes result in marginally lower civilian casualties
than manned strikes (0.067 casualties per RPA strike as compared to 0.099 per manned mission), but
that RPAs are getting significantly better in that respect when considering strikes in non-battlefield
scenarios (a drop from 1.699 casualties per strike in 2009 to 0.036 per strike in 2016). Id.
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where government estimates are readily available.85 A categorical ban on
all LAWS has been called premature, and unsupportable from a legal, policy,
or “operational good sense” perspective.86 Still, others have argued that
weapons with various levels of autonomy are already here, making a ban
untenable in light of the myriad of countries developing such weapons.87
Furthermore, echoing the comments of a number of countries during U.N.
GGE meetings, some experts and policymakers have opined that the time
is rapidly approaching when artificial intelligence will progress to the point
that human beings are the “weakest link” in the decision-making chain.88
Not only do these facts undermine arguments that LAWS are unlawful
under the Martens Clause, they also necessitate real action on the
development of lawful employment TTPs.
This being the case,89 I recommend that autonomous capabilities, and
the precautionary TTPs used to ensure their compliance with the LOAC,
should be employed on a sliding scale90 where they are inversely
proportional to one another. More simply put, the more accurately a
machine can perceive and process its environment, reliably make the “right”
decision in familiar circumstances, and predictably make the “right” decision
in unfamiliar circumstances,91 the less TTPs will require restrictive or robust

85. Id.
86. Schmitt & Thurnher, supra note 82, at 233–34; 2016 France Working Paper, supra note 76,
at 3; 2016 Switzerland Working Paper, supra note 78, at 6; Tucker, supra note 75.
87. See, e.g., Jack M. Beard, Autonomous Weapons and Human Responsibilities, 45 GEO. J. INT’L L.
617, 619–20 (2014) (discussing how many autonomous capabilities already exist in the maritime
domain, and arguing that autonomous weapons are advancing too quickly for law and policy to keep
up).
88. See Crootof, supra note 32, at 1867 (indicating this is happening at DARPA); see also Dan
Lamothe, The Killer Robot Threat: Pentagon Examining How Enemy Nations Could Empower Machines, WASH.
POST (March 30, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2016/03/30/
the-killer-robot-threat-pentagon-examining-how-enemy-nations-could-empower-machines/ [https://
perma.cc/Z3BB-SN3U] (noting Deputy Defense Secretary Work’s comments about only delegating
to machines when “things that go faster than human reaction time, like cyber or electronic warfare”).
89. Rather than having express wisdom over whether it is the right thing to do, from a moral
or ethical standpoint, to rely on fully autonomous weapons.
90. See Beard, supra note 87, at 625–26 (discussing autonomy as existing on a continuum).
91. See Alan Schuller, Autonomous Weapon System and the Decision to Kill, JUST SECURITY
BLOG (Sept. 21, 2017), https://www.justsecurity.org/45164/autonomous-weapon-systems-decisionkill/#more-45164 [https://perma.cc/M45E-EZUA] (pointing to the predictability of a machine’s
decision making in unfamiliar situations as the primary concern related to LAWS and the LOAC
compliance).
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control measures or precaution.92
IV. THE TRAINING WHEELS: PROPOSED EMPLOYMENT TTPS FOR LAWS
A. Preliminary Considerations for Design and Implementation of TTPs
In designing and implementing employment TTPs for LAWS, the first
line that must be drawn is between inherently unlawful weapons and those
weapons that are used in an unlawful manner.93 Most of the talking points
put forth by ban proponents are more about the employment of LAWS, and
the fact that they are not accurate, reliable, or predictable enough for the
situations in which they would be employed. This thinking views autonomy
as binary; a weapon is autonomous or it is not. Contrary to this line of
thinking, it is useful to think of autonomy as a spectrum, rather than an
absolute state.94 That is, there are both various degrees of autonomy, and
differences in kind when discussing autonomy in different functions.95
Autonomous capabilities have been described as impacting each step of
Colonel John Boyd’s “OODA” loop,96 as well as autonomy in various
systems, components, or processes.97
It is also apparent that capabilities in a number of autonomous arenas are
progressing far beyond that believed possible by proponents of a LAWS
ban. Machines have shown the ability to recognize individual human faces
at accuracy rates unthinkable just a few years ago.98 Machines have also
demonstrated the ability, despite contentions to the contrary, to identify and
interpret basic human emotions at a distance using radio frequency (RF)
signals.99 The larger the data set gathered and processed by the analytic
92. See Thurnher, supra note 44, at 82–83 (arguing that, while LAWS are presumptively legal,
commanders should implement appropriate TTPs to ensure their lawful employment, and proposing
certain types such as ROE, location of employment, mission considerations, and human supervision).
93. See Beard, supra note 87, at 636 (distinguishing between inherently unlawful weapons and
those that are not).
94. See William C. Marra & Sonia K. McNeil, Understanding “The Loop”: Regulating the Next
Generation of War Machines, 36 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 1139, 1155 (2013) (“As a result, ‘[l]ike
intelligence and consciousness,’ autonomy is best conceived of as existing on a spectrum.”).
95. Crootof, supra note 32, at 1846.
96. Observe, Orient, Decide, Act. Id.
97. For example, autonomy to adjust a flight path and autonomy in selecting a target are
categorically different when discussing lawful employment of LAWS.
98. See, e.g., Intelligence Advanced Research Project Agency (IARPA), Face Recognition Prize
Challenge (FRPC), IARPA, https://www.iarpa.gov/index.php/working-with-iarpa/prize-challenges/
959-face-recognition-prize-challenge-frpc, [https://perma.cc/2QFR-4K7L].
99. Choi, supra note 41.
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algorithm of MIT’s emotion sensing system, the more reliably and
predictably it can be used to interpret both familiar and new emotional
states.100 As sensors, algorithms, and processing power improve, there is
every reason to believe that the accuracy, reliability, and predictability of
LAWS will improve at a pace similar to other advances in technology. That
being the case, there is a relatively intuitive approach to designing and
implementing employment TTPs to mitigate the weaknesses in any
particular LAWS.101
For machines with high degrees of autonomy, current capabilities are
likely insufficient to simply “turn them loose” on the battlefield. Thus, they
would require a comprehensive approach, implementing a number of
employment TTPs as precautions to account for this lack of capability.
However, the more accurate, reliable, and predictable LAWS become, the
less robust or comprehensive would those TTPs need to be. Furthermore,
because different systems may have greater degrees of autonomous
capability in different functions, the precautionary TTPs employed may vary
from system to system. Regardless, rather than looking for a single “silver
bullet” to solve all shortfalls of LAWS, a comprehensive, multidisciplinary
approach to mitigating their shortfalls should be employed.102 These
mitigation TTPs can be broadly divided into Mission Design Controls,
Capability Design Controls, and “Cognitive” Design Controls.
B. Autonomous Weapon System Employment TTPs
1.

Mission Design Controls

For the purposes of this article, the concept of mission design controls
means the employment of various constraints on the missions with which
LAWS are tasked. These constraints may be temporally based, spatially
100. Id.
101. The United States’ position is that employment of LAWS includes the responsibility to
develop adequate training, TTPs, and doctrine to understand the functioning, capabilities, and
limitations of LAWS in realistic environments. United States, Human-Machine Interaction in the
Development, Deployment and Use of Emerging Technologies in the Area of Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems 3
(Group of Gov’t Experts of the High Contracting Parties to the Convention on Prohibitions or
Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively
Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, Paper No. 6, 2018), [hereinafter 2018 U.S. Working
Paper]. This requirement includes periodic review by system operators and commanders to ensure
continued operational relevance, and a thorough understanding of the limitations and appropriate
circumstances for employment of such LAWS.
102. Schuller, supra note 91.
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based, or target based. The concept is to adequately scope the mission of a
LAWS to its capabilities in terms of sensory, analytical, and decision making
capabilities. The first mitigation method is more of a question of mission
assessment rather than a TTP. It is a core tenet of leadership that a
commander must only “employ [his] unit in accordance with its
capabilities.”103 The same concept should apply to LAWS, and they should
only be employed in missions or operational environments commensurate
with their capabilities to ensure that they are employed in a manner
consistent with the LOAC. United States Government policy is to ensure
that commanders must use weapons in a manner consistent with their
design, testing, certification, and operator training.104 This requirement is
to ensure that systems always achieve the commander’s intent, effectively
leaving the decision of when and whether to use force up to a human
commander.105 With this in mind, inherent in any operational design is an
understanding of the operational environment in which LAWS would be
employed. If there are portions of the operational environment to which
the particular LAWS are unsuited, then an assessment should also be made
as to whether there are certain areas to which they are suited. The concept
of time and space106 deconfliction is common in warfighting organizations
around the world.
For instance, allied forces often employ the concept of a restrictive fire
plan or restricted fire area.107 These are fire support coordination measures
put in place which restrict fires, and the effects of fires, in certain areas as a
way to establish air and ground maneuver space that is reasonably free from
the effects of friendly fire.108 United States military doctrine also requires
an assessment of potential civilian casualties when planning fire support or
other lethal actions,109 and fires elements are further required to develop
procedures to minimize collateral damage or effects on civilian objects.110
103. MARINE CORPS WARFIGHTING PUBLICATION 6-10, LEADING MARINES 2-6 (May 2,
2016) [hereinafter MCWP 6-10].
104. See U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., supra note 17, at § 4(a) (“Autonomous and semi-autonomous
weapon systems shall be designed to allow commanders and operators to exercise appropriate levels
of human judgment over the use of force.”).
105. 2018 U.S. Working Paper, supra note 101, at 3.
106. See, e.g., id. (describing the use of geographic boundaries with LAWS would be employed).
107. NATO, NATO GLOSSARY OF TERMS AND DEFINITIONS (AAP-6) 2-R-8 (2013).
108. Id.
109. ARMED FORCES OF THE U.S., JOINT PUBLICATION 3–09: JOINT FIRE SUPPORT xv–xvi
(2014) [hereinafter JP 3-09].
110. Id. at II-7, III-15.
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Part of these precautionary measures include the implementation of
restrictive fire support coordination, or control measures that impose
restrictions on the ability of fires elements to conduct lethal action in certain
areas.111 Such measures include restricted fires lines (RFLs),112 no-fire
areas (NFA),113 and restricted fires areas (RFAs).114 Of course, if fires
restrictions alone are insufficient, they could also be paired with maneuver
and airspace control measures. These types of measures include boundaries
across which fires and movement are restricted without appropriate
coordination,115 or various airspace control measures that restrict aircraft
travel.116
Many of these concepts of time and space deconfliction have already been
applied to LAWS in various contexts. Appropriate time and space
constraints on the employment of LAWS can help to mitigate the difficult
question of proportionality, by ensuring that LAWS are employed in areas
where they can reasonably be expected to encounter only valid military
objectives.117 The question of proportionality is highly context-dependent,
and can vary based on time.118 Because the question of proportionality is
so context dependent, the answer is to employ LAWS in a manner that
minimizes the possibility for relevant change in that context. This can be
done by making intelligent, informed employment decisions such as
deploying LAWS in areas reasonably expected to be free of civilians and
civilian objects.119 Alternatively, LAWS could be employed for short
periods of time, during which a commander would have reasonable certainty
that only valid military targets would be within the engagement area. For
instance, the South Korean military employs the SGR-1 along the Korean

111. Id. at App. 1.
112. RFLs prohibit fires, or the effects of fires, across the RFL line without prior coordination
with the affected force or battlespace owner. Id. at A-12.
113. NFAs prohibit fires within a certain, predefined area. Id. at A-12.
114. RFAs impose specific restrictions on fires within the area, and any fires that exceed those
restrictions are not permitted unless coordinated with/approved by the headquarters which established
the RFA.
115. JP 3-09, supra note 109, at A-14.
116. These include air corridors, in which aircraft are confined to travel; restricted operations
zones, in which the airspace is reserved for only specific activities (e.g., ISR); and no fly areas, in which
no aircraft are permitted without approval of the appropriate commander. Id. at A-16.
117. Crootof, supra note 32, at 1876–77.
118. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 6, at 32.
119. While such circumstances may be limited in recent military operations against non-state
actors, this may not always be the case.
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De-Militarized Zone (DMZ), where human beings can be presumed to be
hostile attackers from North Korea (DPRK).120
Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems could also be employed in
defensive roles, and be programmed only to attack targets that meet a very
specific threat signature.121 This method is employed by the U.S. Close in
Weapons System (CIWS) and British PHALANX,122 as well as the U.S. CRAM.123 The accurate identification of a threat is simplified in these
systems, as they are programmed to identify the signatures of incoming
missile or rocket threats, which are relatively easily distinguished from any
civilian non-combatant.124 Defensive employment also mitigates the risk
of an improper offensive engagement, as it can be based on very strict and
specific criteria to identify a threat.
Another potential employment TTP is to place constraints on the mission
with which LAWS are tasked, commensurate with their sensor and analytical
capabilities. It is entirely possible to have an autonomous system with lethal
capabilities, but under the circumstances to make the decision that it will
only be employed in non-lethal missions. The U.S. Navy is developing the
Sea Hunter, which includes mine hunting, tracking, and navigation
capabilities.125 However, it is contemplated that the Sea Hunter would also
have anti-submarine warfare capabilities, including lethal capabilities,
depending upon the mission tasking.126 The same is true of the U.S. Navy’s
developmental Wave Glider unmanned underwater vehicle (UUV).127 The
question of whether the employment of those lethal capabilities is
appropriate in a given situation must be assessed by the commander, prior
to employment. Autonomous systems have already shown the ability to
combine a visual sensor array, an image library for comparison, an image
recognition algorithm, and human operator input and refinement to

120. Schmitt & Thurnher, supra note 82, at 238 n.26.
121. Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross (ICRC), Views of the International Committee of the Red
Cross (ICRC) on Autonomous Weapon Systems 2 (Apr. 11, 2016) (unpublished working paper) (on
file with the LAWS Group Governmental of Experts) [hereinafter 2016 ICRC Working Paper].
122. Beard, supra note 87, at 630–31.
123. Essentially a ground-based variant of the CIWS. supra note 6, at 9–10.
124. 2016 ICRC Working Paper, supra note 121, at 2; ICRC 2015 Report, supra note 18, at 45.
125. Beck, supra note 24.
126. Id.
127. Peck, supra note 25.
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recognize targets at a rate of 99% accuracy.128 The same concept could
also be applied to enemy vehicles during an armed conflict. If a particular
enemy vehicle129 has a sufficiently recognizable visual signature, and an
autonomous weapon is employed in an area in which it is likely to encounter
such vehicles, then there is every reason to believe that the autonomous
weapon could sufficiently distinguish between military objectives and
civilian objects.130
Facial recognition capabilities are also rapidly improving, and the U.S.
Government is actively encouraging commercial development of those
capabilities.131 Chinese132 and Russian133 firms have demonstrated the
ability—as part of the Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Agency’s
(IARPA) Face Recognition Prize Challenge—to identify with high degrees
of speed and accuracy photographs of known persons, including in
situations when the photograph being compared is compromised by poor
illumination, motion blur, or other suboptimal conditions.134 The Russian
firm has also developed software that has shown the ability to match
photographs of random strangers on Russian social media sites.135 Just as
with non-human target recognition, facial recognition software could be
used to target known enemy high-value individuals. Once this ability to
128. Evan Ackerman, Poison Injecting Robot Submarine Assassinates Sea Stars to Save Coral Reefs, IEEE
SPECTRUM (Sept. 3, 2015), http://spectrum.ieee.org/automaton/robotics/industrial-robots/poisonrobot-submarine [https://perma.cc/BHE4-UVLC].
129. For example, tanks, armored personnel carriers, etc.
130. Such a signature recognition capability appears to be in use with the United States’ Sensor
Fuzed Weapon, and the BLU-108 submunition. BLU-108/B Submunition, GLOBALSECURITY.ORG,
https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/munitions/blu-108.htm [https://perma.cc/CQE3L9A9]. Each submunition consists of 4 “pucks,” equipped with a combination of active laser and
passive infrared sensors to identify target vehicles. Id. In the absence of target vehicles, the “puck”
submunition self-destructs after a given time. Id. (discussing the BLU-108 component of the Sensor
Fuzed Weapon).
131. See Intelligence Advanced Research Project Agency (IARPA), supra note 98 (inviting
software developers to register for the “Face Recognition Prize Challenge”).
132. Yitu Tech Wins 1st Place in Identification Accuracy in Face Recognition Prize Challenge 2017,
PR NEWSWIRE (Nov. 3, 2017), https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/yitu-tech-wins-the-1stplace-in-identification-accuracy-in-face-recognition-prize-challenge-2017-300549292.html
[https://perma.cc/M4F5-HW4A].
133. Immanuel Jotham, Russian Tech Firm Wins US Intelligence Agency’s Facial Recognition Software
Competition, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Nov. 9, 2017), http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/russian-tech-firm-wins-usintelligence-agencys-facial-recognition-software-competition-1646588
[https://perma.cc/8PEV6WPE].
134. Yitu Tech Wins 1st Place in Identification Accuracy in Face Recognition Prize Challenge 2017, supra
note 132.
135. Jotham, supra note 133.
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distinguish is established and refined, then the question of proportionality
can be addressed by employing these mission limitations in combination
with the time and space deconfliction concepts discussed previously.
2.

Capability Design Controls

Assignment of particular missions should also be paired with, and based
upon the capabilities of any particular LAWS. For the discussion on
“capabilities”, the focus will remain on the physical and sensory capabilities
of a particular autonomous system, while capabilities relating to
algorithmic processing and decision making will be addressed in the section
on “cognitive” design. The U.S. military is actively researching a number
of non-lethal capabilities.136 These include weapons such as the Active
Denial System (ADS),137 optical or laser dazzlers,138 as well as weapons
that use the electromagnetic spectrum to disable enemy equipment.139 At
a less experimental level, U.S. Coast Guard Academy cadets have tested the
concept of arming off-the-shelf drones140 with a variety of non-lethal
weapons such as pepper spray and propeller nets in an effort to
counter drug smuggling TTPs that exploit the Coast Guards’ “no-kill”

136. Rosa Brooks, Can There Be War Without Soldiers?, FOREIGN POLICY (March 16, 2016),
http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/03/15/can-there-be-war-without-soldiers-weapons-cyberwarfare/
[https://perma.cc/D87T-MFA7].
137. Id. The ADS is effectively a millimeter wave emitter that makes the target feel an extreme
sensation of heat, which abates as soon as the person moves out of the targeted area (the “repel effect”).
The ADS is currently in development as a vehicle mounted capability, and has an effective range of
several hundred meters. Although fielded, the ADS has never been employed on a battlefield. See
Active Denial Technology, JOINT NON-LETHAL WEAPONS PROGRAM, http://jnlwp.defense.gov/FutureNon-Lethal-Weapons/Active-Denial-Technology/ [https://perma.cc/A4YU-X2YG] (“Active Denial
Technology is a non-lethal, counter-personnel capability that creates a heating sensation, quickly
repelling potential adversaries with minimal risk of injury.”); John M. Kenny, et al., A Narrative Summary
and Independent Assessment of the Active Denial System, PENN STATE APPLIED RESEARCH LAB. 16 (Feb. 11,
2008) (describing the normal and intended use of the ADS). While the millimeter wave technology
can cause heat injuries (superficial burns) with extended exposure, that there is a wide safety margin
between the length of exposure that produces the “repel effect,” and the length of exposure that could
cause either first or second degree burns.
138. Kenny, et. al., supra note 137. Used to temporarily “blind” a target through visual
disorientation.
139. Id.
140. Julia Bergman, Cadets Turn to Drones for Non-Lethal Method to Stop Drug Boats, THE DAY
(March 15, 2016), http://www.theday.com/military/20160315/cadets-turn-to-drones-for-non-lethalmethod-to-stop-drug-boats [https://perma.cc/U8DU-QJJK]. While not autonomous, there is every
reason to believe that an autonomous counterpart with similar physical capacity could be similarly
equipped.
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policy.141 These types of non-lethal weapons and precautionary TTPs are
specifically designed to limit collateral damage, reduce risk to civilians, and
enhance the military’s ability to separate civilians from combatants.142
While autonomous weapon systems equipped solely with these non-lethal
capabilities would not be LAWS, there are two ways in which LAWS could
be paired with such non-lethal means.
The first would be to equip sufficiently capable autonomous systems with
a range of non-lethal capabilities in addition to one or more lethal
capabilities.
Such an autonomous system could then employ a
preprogrammed escalation of force (EOF) protocol.143 These protocols
provide tools and guidance to a service member that can be used to both
de-escalate situations, as well as to further refine a determination as to
whether an individual presents a threat.144 By employing an escalation from
visual warnings, to auditory warnings, non-lethal means, and then lethal
means, a service member (or in this case, an autonomous system) could both
avoid civilian casualties and further identify potential threats.145 Another
method would be to effectively “team” a number of autonomous systems
equipped with non-lethal capabilities alongside those equipped with lethal
capabilities, and employing a similarly preprogrammed escalation of force
protocol. These courses of action—equipping autonomous systems with a
range of non-lethal and lethal capabilities or teaming non-lethal systems with
lethal ones—could be superior to the human employment of the EOF
protocols for two reasons.
First, U.S. military members in combat zones are taught that the EOF
procedures are not a rigid checklist, but guidelines.146 If the situation
necessitates, a service member may skip any or all of the steps in the EOF
protocol, and immediately resort to lethal force.147 Because autonomous
141. Id. In essence, drug smugglers will lay across the engine block to defeat the USCG tactic
of using an anti-materiel round (.50 BMG) to disable an engine. Id. NLW that get a smuggler to move
off of the engine block could prove an effective counter, allowing the USCG to then employ an
otherwise lethal means to disable the engine.
142. JP 3-09, supra note 111, at xvi; Joint Publication 3-28, Defense Support of Civil Authorities
III-9 (July 31, 2013) [hereinafter, JP 3-28].
143. For example, the “show, shout, shove, shoot” methodology. Escalation of Force Handbook:
Afghanistan, CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED 61–62 (Dec. 2009); Law of War, Rules of
Engagement, and Escalation of Force Guide, MARINE CORPS CENTER FOR LESSONS LEARNED 412 n.385
(Sept. 24, 2007).
144. Law of War, supra note 143, at 23–26.
145. Id.; Escalation of Force Handbook: Afghanistan, supra note 143.
146. Escalation of Force Handbook: Afghanistan, supra note 143, at 59–62, 64, 68–70, 57–58, 66, 77.
147. Id.
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weapons would not have the same self-preservation instincts as human
beings, they could more rigidly apply those EOF procedures, even if it
meant sacrificing one or more of the weapon platforms. Secondly, if a target
persists in a hostile act after the employment of EOF procedures, then it
would assist the LAWS in making the distinction necessary to identify a
potential target as hostile.148 A sample EOF procedure could be the
employment of auditory warnings such as the Long Range Acoustic Device
(LRAD), followed by visual signals from flares or the aforementioned laser
dazzlers,149 and finally the employment of various non-lethal weapons such
as the ADS or pepper spray. The ability to employ this range of capabilities
prior to lethal force provides critical information which could contribute to
both greater accuracy in a LAWS’ identification of a potential threat, as well
as reduced consequences of making an incorrect determination.150
Autonomous systems, either individual or teamed,151 could be programmed
to only employ lethal force after first employing each of these EOF steps,
and thereby failing to neutralize the threat.
This appears to be a TTP employed by some autonomous systems
already. For example, the Israeli Guardian is an autonomous ground system
that can be armed with a variety of both lethal and non-lethal payloads.152
In addition, the South Korean SGR-1 is programmed to employ verbal
commands prior to target engagement.153 While the SGR-1 is not currently
employed in a fully autonomous mode,154 it does have a fully autonomous
capability in the event no human operator is available.155 Employment of
verbal warnings, or any other non-lethal weapon prior to employing lethal

148. U.S. DEP’T OF DEF. DIRECTIVE NO. 3000.03E, DOD EXECUTIVE AGENT FOR NONLETHAL WEAPONS (NLW), AND NLW POLICY (Apr. 25, 2013 (W/CH. 1, Sept. 27, 2017)) [hereinafter,
DODD 3000.03E]; JP 3-09, supra note 111, at xvi.
149. Brooks, supra note 136.
150. A description of EOF can be found on the Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Directorate FAQ
page. Non-Lethal Weapons FAQS, NON-LETHAL WEAPONS PROGRAM, http://jnlwp.defense.gov/
About/Frequently-Asked-Questions/Non-Lethal-Weapons-FAQs/
[https://perma.cc/9H92-UT
WU]. NLW provides a solution to the “gap” between auditory warnings (“shout”) and lethal force
(“shoot”). Id. It permits a service member, or LAWS to “detect, delay, deny, and defeat” potential
threats with greater accuracy and less collateral damage. Id.
151. Teaming could include teaming with other systems, human operators, or both.
152. Crootof, supra note 32, at 1869–70.
153. Id. at 1869.
154. Id. As currently employed, there is apparently always a human operator making the
“shoot/no-shoot” decisions.
155. Id.
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force, by the SGR-1 or other LAWS would appear to be a matter of simple
programming.
Similarly, tied to both the concept of distinction and the concept of
mission design, is the TTP of pairing a system’s potential targets with its
sensors. Put another way, this ensures that a particular LAWS only sees the
target that a force wishes to attack. Pairing a system’s potential targets with
its sensors would require the employment of technology which includes a
library of only acceptable targets,156 and then employing a lethal capability
only when the LAWS receives specific sensor input that matches the
acceptable template of that target.157 In essence, only allow the weapon to
strike what it “sees,” and only let it “see” potential targets.158 For instance,
the Israeli Harpy/Harop is an expendable UAV that is intended to target
enemy radar arrays.159 The Harpy/Harop is equipped with a list of
potential target frequencies, and strikes when it “sees” a radar emission
signature that matches one in its target library.160 The United Kingdom’s
Brimstone missile employs a similar capability when employed in “lock after
launch” mode, in that it compares what it “sees” to a catalog of known
enemy target signatures.161 The U.S. Navy and Defense Advanced
Research Projects Administration (DARPA) have also developed an
unmanned surface vehicle (USV/ACTUV) that is designed to track quiet
diesel-electric submarines.162 In order to identify potential targets,
USV/AVTUV identifies and tracks enemy submarines from the surface
using unique pairings of sonar and acoustic signatures.163
Machines with remote sensors have also shown the capability to sense
emotional states such as stress by reading physiological inputs like pulse,164
or other emotions through recognition of facial expression patterns.165
Autonomous systems have also demonstrated highly accurate facial
recognition—including in less than ideal circumstances—in U.S.

156. Tucker, supra note 75.
157. Beard, supra note 87, at 629–30.
158. Crootof, supra note 32, at 1874.
159. Harpy, IAI, https://www.iai.co.il/p/harpy (last visited July 22, 2019) [https://perma.cc/
9YEA-6KHV].
160. Crootof, supra note 32.
161. ROYAL AIR FORCE, supra note 56.
162. Gady, supra note 24.
163. Id.
164. MACDUFF ET AL., supra note 39, at 4001.
165. Choi, supra note 41.
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Intelligence Community sponsored research and competitions.166 Jack
Gallant’s research has also demonstrated that machines are capable of
effectively “reading minds,” and while that capability currently requires
physical contact of electrodes with a person’s head,167 it is foreseeable that
the machines could develop the ability to perceive and process brain activity
at a distance. These capabilities undercut assertions that LAWS would be
incapable of distinguishing a civilian from a combatant, as they would be
unable to understand human emotion.168 The use of appropriate sensors,
combined with signature identification algorithms, machine learning, and
human operator refined decision making also lead into the next discussion
of “cognitive” design based mitigation measures.
3.

Cognitive Design Controls

“Cognitive” based controls mean that the degree of automation, or the
extent to which a LAWS is “turned loose” in the operational environment,
varies based upon its ability to perceive and process its environment.
Cognitive based controls is not a new concept, as authors have previously
identified that the level of automation that is appropriate varies according
to the task to be performed. For instance, given the current state of
robotics169 machines tend to be better suited to repeatable processes and
predictable situations in which a single, rote response is appropriate;170
whereas human beings tend to perform at a superior level in uncertain
situations that require expertise or “intuition.”171 The limitations on
machines generally relate to their ability to reliably and predictably sense
their environment, process the inputs from their various sensors, and
appropriately respond when a situation is new or different from those
contemplated when developing its programming.172 These limitations are
based on the fact that most machine learning is based on statistical analysis

166. Intelligence Advanced Research Project Agency (IARPA), supra note 98.
167. Nishimoto et al., supra note 42. Part of the research team’s conclusion is that dynamic
brain activity, not specific to only visual experiences, can be decoded using MRI technology.
168. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 6, at 28.
169. Or at least the state of robotics in 2014. Beard, supra, note 87, at 629–30.
170. Mary Cummings, Man Versus Machine or Man + Machine?, IEEE INTELLIGENT SYS.,
Sept.–Oct. 2014, at 2, 3 tbl.1. In the context of LAWS, this is generally termed “automated” as
opposed to “autonomous.”
171. Id. at 2, 3.
172. Id. at 2, 5–8.
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and pattern matching.173 Without a sufficient baseline for comparison of a
new situation, this machine learning breaks down. Given these limitations,
the level of automation appropriate to a given situation decreases, the
further a task moves away from learned skills or repetitive tasks, and toward
the application of knowledge to new or uncertain situations.174 For those
tasks requiring a higher degree of knowledge or improvisation,
manned/unmanned teams have produced superior results to either of those
“team members” acting alone in tasks as varied as chess, and search and
rescue.175 The U.S. Department of Defense is already evaluating and
advocating for this concept of manned/machine teaming;176 Deputy
Secretary of Defense Robert Work described a system in which a manned
fighter would “lead” a swarm of Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles
(UCAV) in combination with an “aerial artillery” platform.177
One of the concerns raised with manned/unmanned teaming is that of
mere human “ratification” of the decision of the machine, where a human
operator is incapable of second-guessing the assessment and decision made
by a computer.178 To avoid such an outcome, the type and degree of
human oversight should be scoped to the capability of the machine. For
instance, where an autonomous system is less capable of making the
appropriate decision, then a system of vehicle-based supervisory control
173. Id. at 2, 8. This type of learning is sometimes called the “search and filter” approach, where
the machine processes data until it finds something in its memory that approximates a close enough
match to its sensor inputs.
174. Id. at 2, 5–8, 8 tbl.3.
175. Id. at 2, 8.
176. Clay Dillow, The Pentagon Wants Autonomous Fighter Jets to Join the F-35 in Combat,
FORTUNE (Mar. 30, 2016), http://fortune.com/2016/03/30/autonomous-fighter-jets-join-the-f-35/
[https://perma.cc/T227-JJTZ].
177. Jules Hurst, Drones and the Future of Aerial Combined Arms, WAR ON THE ROCKS
(May 12, 2016), http://warontherocks.com/2016/05/drones-and-the-future-of-aerial-combinedarms/ [https://perma.cc/8QAN-924Q]. The “aerial artillery” platform would essentially be a large
platform aircraft, armed with heavier weapons including both air-to-air, and air-to-surface attack
capabilities. Id. This platform would serve the dual roles of heavy weapons platform, and command
and control (C2) node for the manned fighter and UCAV swarm. Id. The concept is also being
employed in the civilian conservation arena, yet again, in the form of COTSBot, which currently uses
an “in the loop” model by relaying an image of a suspected COTS to an operator, and the operator
then makes the kill/no-kill decision. However, COTSBot still employs a level of machine learning, as
it continues to “learn” and refine its identification ability by both amassing a larger data set for
comparison of suspected COTS, and improving accuracy with human input. New Robot has
Crown-of-Thorns Starfish in its Sights, supra note 35.
178. Allyson Hauptman, Autonomous Weapons and the Law of Armed Conflict, 218 MIL. L. REV. 170,
186–87 (2013).
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(VBSC) in which an operator supervises one or more vehicles individually
may be appropriate.179 Whereas, when individual LAWS become more
capable, then it may be appropriate to shift to a system based supervisory
control (SBSC) model, in which a single operator monitors a system
composed of numerous individual vehicles.180 This model of supervisory
control has been validated as a means to control swarming vehicles,181 as
well as the fastest model for integrating/controlling UAVs on aircraft carrier
flight decks.182 Similar capabilities have been validated in the context of
civilian air traffic control operations.183 In addition to the method of
supervision, and the number of vehicles supervised by a human operator,
the character of supervision should be considered as well.
There is often a discussion as to whether LAWS would require an
affirmative operator decision to engage a target,184 or whether it is sufficient
that a human operator has the authority to override or “veto” a machine’s
decision to engage a target.185 These concepts are often referred to
respectively as “in the loop,” or “on the loop.”186 There are several
concerns with “on the loop” systems, in which the operator would exercise
only an override. The first is that, in the absence of sufficient time for the
operator to independently assess the situation before the machine acts, then
this effectively becomes an “out of the loop” system, in which the operator
179. JASON C. RYAN & MARY L. CUMMINGS, A SYSTEMS ANALYSIS OF THE INTRODUCTION
UNMANNED AIRCRAFT INTO AIRCRAFT CARRIER OPERATIONS 8 (2019), https://hal.
pratt.duke.edu/sites/hal.pratt.duke.edu/files/u35/ATR_CEDM%20final%20R1%20updated.pdf
[https://perma.cc/UEK6-D539]. It may be appropriate to start with “one vehicle, one operator,” and
shift to having a single operator supervise multiple vehicles as LAWS become more capable, reliable,
and predictable. Note, however, that the upper limit of a human operator to supervise individual
vehicles appears to be in the neighborhood of eight to twelve vehicles per operator. Id. Ryan and
Cummings also evaluated a “gesture based” supervisory control, in which autonomous systems would
take cues from gestures by human operators. Id. This was the least effective form of control and
appeared related to deficiencies in the machine’s ability to both recognize discrete gestures and process
those gestures as quickly as either human pilots or the machines taking direction from other supervisory
systems. Id.
180. Id.
181. Drew, supra note 20.
182. Id.
183. Miles C. Aubert et al., Toward the Development of a Low-Altitude Air Traffic Control Paradigm for
Networks of Small, Autonomous Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, AM. INST. AERONAUTICS & ASTRONAUTICS,
INC., Jan. 2015, at 1.
184. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 6, at 2; Trapp, supra note 63, at 4–5.
185. M. L. CUMMINGS ET AL., Functional Requirements for Onboard Intelligent Automation in Single
Pilot Operations, in AM. INST. OF AERONAUTICS & ASTRONAUTICS INFOTECH CONFERENCE 6 (2016);
Schmitt & Thurnher, supra note 82, at 235–36.
186. Hauptman, supra note 178, at 185 n.52.
OF
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has no real input or override authority.187 Similarly, if a system or swarm
under human supervision becomes too large, then a human being may be
unable to process the myriad inputs from all of the disparate individual
vehicles in order to monitor the total system effectively.188 A final concern
is that of operator bias in the form of a reluctance or inability to secondguess the machine.189 While LAWS in their current state likely require an
operator “in the loop” in order to pass Article 36 weapons review
muster,190 it is by no means true that this should always be the case. For
instance, with certain types of threats, defensive LAWS, such as the U.S.
Navy’s Close in Weapons System (CIWS) and the Army Counter Rocket,
Artillery, Mortar (C-RAM) systems, are able to autonomously identify, track,
and destroy threats such as enemy anti-ship missiles or incoming rocket or
artillery fire.191
On the one hand, there is some merit to the argument that, although the
CIWS and C-RAM are LAWS, they are less prone to mistakes about
distinction and proportionality because they are anti-material weapons,
rather than anti-personnel weapons. They are designed to identify, track,
and destroy only those targets that move and behave inapposite to humans
or manned targets, making it either unlikely or impossible to accidentally
target a human being.192 In fact, this statistical unlikelihood stems from
modern technology, which is capable of readily identifying the unique
signatures associated with anti-ship missiles, rocket fires, or mortar rounds.
As sensing, processing, and algorithmic technology improves, other forms
of threats may be just as easily recognized, despite the difficulty of their
ready recognition given current technology.193 Thus, the more accurately
machines are able to perceive and process their environment; the less reliant
187. Schmitt & Thurnher, supra note 82.
188. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 6, at 19.
189. See Hauptman, supra note 178, at 186 (discussing the U.S. Navy’s C-RAM system that has
such quick reaction time that humans have less time for corrective action).
190. Trapp, supra note 63, at 8 (quoting the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of
12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts
(Protocol I), of 8 June 1977, art. 36, opened for signature 12 Dec. 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3). The United
States has not ratified AP I, but does perform legal reviews on all new weapons, including weapon
systems incorporating autonomous capabilities. See U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., supra note 17, at 8
(“Incorporating Change 1, May 8, 2017”); U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., DIRECTIVE NO. 5000.01, THE
DEFENSE ACQUISITION SYSTEM 2 (Nov. 21, 2007) (“provid[ing] management principles and
mandatory policies and procedures for managing all acquisition programs.”).
191. Crootof, supra note 32, at 1858–59.
192. Id. at 1875.
193. Id. at 1867; Lamothe, supra note 88.
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LAWS should be on the humans, either “in” or “on” the loop, to oversee
engagement decisions.
V. CONCLUSION
In summary, calls for a pre-emptive, and all-encompassing ban on LAWS
are not simply premature; they are based on incorrect legal and factual
assertions about the current and potential capabilities of LAWS.194
Furthermore, the less capable LAWS are, then the more robust or extensive
control measures should be to mitigate that lack of capability. As LAWS
become increasingly capable, then those control measures can be lessened
in a way that can more fully utilize the autonomous capabilities of LAWS in
an operational environment commensurate with their capabilities in order
to ensure employment in accordance with the LOAC.
The critical concerns are whether the employment of LAWS comply with
the LOAC. The most contentious area of debate is whether LAWS can
accurately, reliably, and predictably distinguish between civilians and
combatants.195 There is also the difficult question of proportionality; the
highly context-dependent balancing of the military advantage to be gained
against the expected harm to civilians or civilian objects.196 As described
below, when paired with the appropriate control measures, and employed
in an appropriate operating environment, not only could LAWS be
employed in compliance with the LOAC in the future; there is every reason
to believe that LAWS could do so today.
Current autonomous capabilities include swarm communications and
actions,197 and manned/unmanned teaming.198 Such systems could be
paired with vehicle-based supervisory control measures, and as they become
more capable, could shift to a system based supervisory control system.199
This has promise when considering the improvement seen in
manned/unmanned teams, as compared to all manned or all unmanned
teams.200 These types of control measures could also be paired initially with
“human-in-the-loop,” decision making, which could shift to “human-on194. Schmitt & Thurnher, supra note 82, at 232–33.
195. ICRC 2015 Report, supra note 18, at 45.
196. Id.; SCHMITT, supra note 58.
197. Hardy, supra note 19.
198. Cummings, supra note 170, at 2, 8.
199. Ryan & Cummings, supra note 179.
200. Cummings, supra note 170, at 2, 8 (demonstrating the superior outcomes from deploying
a combination of manned, and autonomous/unmanned teammates).
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the-loop,” and perhaps even eventually “human-out-of-the-loop,” systems
as machines become more capable.201
Other potential measures to mitigate deficiencies in the capabilities of
LAWS include mission design and capability design. This could include the
mission with which LAWS are tasked, such as defensive missions,202 mine
hunting/clearance,203 or targeting only a very specific signature readily
associated with a legitimate military target.204 A myriad of geographic,
air/sea space, or fire control measures could be implemented to ensure that
LAWS only employ lethal capabilities in areas where their lack of capability
would not be expected to impact the ability to employ them in accordance
with the LOAC.205 These measures could include employment in an area
where only hostile threats would be expected,206 or by establishing “no fire
areas” where LAWS are not permitted to employ lethal capabilities.207
Capability design controls would include sensor configurations that ensure
LAWS only “see” the targets that they are supposed to strike.208 It could
also include the integration of lethal and non-lethal capabilities,209 and
building escalation of force procedures—the “show, shout, shove, shoot”
model—into the LAWS weapons employment protocols.
These
combinations of capability, mission, and cognitive controls must be
employed in a holistic, and complementary manner to address deficiencies
in LAWS’ capabilities comprehensively.
A comprehensive system of control measures, tailored to the specific
capabilities of a particular system, can effectively ensure that LAWS are
employed in accordance with the LOAC regardless of the operating
environment. Furthermore, it is no mystery that the ability of computers to
201. Schmitt & Thurnher, supra note 82, at 235 n.12.
202. Beard, supra note 87, at 619; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 6, at 9–10.
203. Beck, supra note 24.
204. See ROYAL AIR FORCE, supra note 56 (describing the ability of the Brimstone missile to
identify, and lock onto specific enemy target signatures).
205. See generally JP 3–09, supra note 109, at A-1 to A-2 (“provid[ing] fundamental principles
and guidance for planning, coordinating, executing, and assessing joint fire support during military
operations.”).
206. Crootof, supra note 32, at 1876–77.
207. See generally JP 3–09, supra note 109, at A–2 (“Restrictive measures safeguard friendly forces
and include airspace coordination areas (ACAs), restrictive fire lines (RFLs), no-fire areas (NFAs,
restrictive fire areas (RFAs), and ZFs.”).
208. See Crootof, supra note 32, at 1871 (describing the dedicated precision of the Israeli Harpy
expendable UAV); New Robot has Crown-of-Thorns Starfish in its Sights, supra note 35.
209. Either in a single LAWS, or by integrating a LAWS with manned/unmanned teammates
that are armed only with non-lethal capabilities.
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input and process data is increasing at an exponential rate. The majority of
Americans, and indeed the majority of people worldwide, now effectively
carry computers in their pockets that outstrip the bounds of the imagination
a mere twenty years ago. When paired with the capabilities and possible
associated control measures mentioned above, this massive increase in
electronic analytical capability may very soon make machines the superior
option from a LOAC compliance standpoint.
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